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The Cambridge Journal of Economics witnessed an important debate between Mark 
Pernecky and Paul Wojick on the one side and Rod Thomas on the other about the usefulness 
of Thomas Kuhn’s sociology and philosophy of science in explaining why Keynes’s 
revolutionary ideas exposed in the General Theory have been ‘lost in translation’. This brief 
note is an attempt to reconcile Pernecky and Wojick’s claim that Keynes’s new economics of 
the General Theory and Walrasian General Equilibrium are incommensurable paradigms in 
a Kuhnian understanding and Thomas’s critique that – if they were incommensurable – 
Pernecki and Wojick’s appraisal of Keynes’s paradigm as a better approximation to the ‘real 
world’ than Walsrasian General Equilibrum is inconsistent within that very Kuhnian 
framework. 
 
JEL classification: B 2, B 40, B 5    
 





Pernecky and Wojick (henceforth P&W) published a very “insightful analysis” (Thomas 
2020, 1423) in the Cambridge Journal of Economics on the nature of Keynesian and 
Walrasian economics in order to better understand “why the key theoretical constructs 
found in the General Theory […] have […] been ignored or misrepresented: or they have 
been mistranslated when an effort has been made to ‘absorb’ them […]” (Pernecky and 
Wojick 2019, 770). According to P&W, this is not due to a conceptional vagueness on the 
part of Keynes, but due to the incommensurability of Keynes’s new economics and 
theorising on Walrasian general equilibrium. The lack of awareness of such paradigmatic 
incommensurability and the inability of most economists who attempted to make sense 
of the General Theory to disentangle themselves from preconceived ideas meant that they 
read Keynes’s theoretical contributions through the lens of Walrasian general 
equilibrium. As a result, “(t)his does an obvious injustice to Keynes and an even more 
important injustice to the goal of producing an accurate and ultimately helpful 
understanding of the ‘economic society in which we actually live’” (Pernecky and Wojick 
2019, 770). 
By using the conceptions of ‘incommensurability’ and ‘paradigm’, P&W explicity refer to 
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions. For Kuhn, scientific revolutions occur 
when the reigning paradigm has fallen into ‘crisis’ due to internal (deductive) 
inconsistencies or external (inductive) falsification and will eventually be abandoned for 
a competing paradigm if (and only if) such a competing paradigm exists and is unaffected 
by the internal or external factors that triggered the crisis. Of course, the Great Depression 
of the 1930s has been seen by many as the external factor falsifying Walrasian general 
equilibrium economics in general or the (neo-)classical, self-regulating economics of the 
Marshallian and Pigouvian mould in particular (which was the main target of Keynes’s 
attack on the ‘citadel’). Keynes’s new economics of the General Theory were taken as the 
new paradigm, eagerly accepted mainly by the younger generation of economists in the 
USA (see e.g. Stanfield 1974) – the rising hegemon of academic economics after WW2. 
P&W’s point is that such a Kuhnian revolution never occurred because the necessary 
paradigm shift failed to materialise. And this was the case because early interpreters of 
the General Theory and, later, most other economists failed to replace their lenses, instead 
viewing the General Theory through their accustomed prism of the Walrasian paradigm, 
2 
ignoring the problem of paradigm incommensurability.1 
Although Thomas (2020) found this analysis ‘insightful’ (see above), he critizises P&W for 
running into an internal inconsistency: “[...] if P&W are right in declaring Keynes’s ideas 
to be superior, then they must be wrong in thinking that Keynes and WGE [Walrasian 
General Equilibrium, A.H.] present incommensurate paradigms. To by-pass this 
contradiction, P&W assume the virtues of a pre-Kuhnian philosophy of science and use it 
to contrast Keynes and WGE. But this resorts to a philosophy that their Kuhnian meta-
framework overtly discards” (Thomas 2020, 1423). The solution he proposes is to 
abandon the ‘Kuhnian prison’ as the backdrop for a criticism of Walrasian general 
economics and to adopt “the philosophical attitude of critical rationalism” (Thomas 2020, 
1415). 
2. The incommensurability, incompatibility and incomparability of 
paradigms 
I would like to begin my brief remarks with a disclaimer: I do not believe an economics 
journal to be the right place for a discussion of the philosophy and sociology of knowledge 
of Thomas Kuhn. Although it must be acknowledged that Kuhn’s conceptions of the 
‘paradigm’ and ‘incommensurability’ are certainly vague and in need of interpretation, I 
will not engage in discussing what Kuhn meant or what Kuhn really meant. Therefore, I 
am not discussing whether Kuhn took ‘incommensurability’ and ‘incomparability’ as 
synonymous or, at least, supplementary, or whether he saw his philosophy of science as 
incompatible or even incommensurate (and, therefore, incomparable?) with critical 
rationalism. Rather, I take – eclectically – those parts of Kuhn’s theory – of course, as I 
understand them or as I believe them to make sense – which I rate as useful in 
understanding the development of the economic discipline.  
The moodiness of Kuhn’s concept of a paradigm is legendary: it is said that his Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) contains as many as 21 different definitions of what a 
paradigm is (see Masterman 1970). This is why it might be advisable to borrow more 
definite content from the Lakatosian concept of Scientific Research Programmes (SRP), 
which is less catchy but similar in conceptual meaning: a paradigm or SRP is the set of 
                                                          
1 The disequilibrium economics of Robert Clower and the ‘rationing approach’ of Edmond Malinvaud 
are probably extreme examples of Walrasian interpretations of Keynes’s theoretical constructs, 
completely ignoring his analysis but merely inferring what Keynes must have “[…] had in the back of 
his mind” (Clower 1965: 290). 
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theories and models which form the backbone of scientific inquiry. What is more 
important than the label is the content: paradigms or SRPs comprise three dimensions: 
1) The ontological or heuristic dimension is concerned with the essence of the object of 
inquiry: its basic constituents. It represents the ‘world view’ underlying a paradigm or, as 
Schumpeter termed it, its ‘pre-analytic vision’. 
2) The epistemological dimension breaks down the pre-analytical vision situated in the 
ontological dimension into core and auxiliary assumptions or, in Lakatosian terms, 
determines the ‘negative heuristic’ which “specifies certain claims of the research 
programme as not revisable” (Brahmachari 2016, p. 5) and the ‘positive heuristic’ forming 
a protective belt around the core axioms. This can be tinkered with if, for instance, 
empirical evidence or the pursuit of a particular perspective indicate it would be politic 
to do so. 
3) The methodological dimension can be seen as ‘meta-methodical’, as it specifies the 
procedures accepted by the epistemic community to discriminate between ‘truth’ and 
‘non-truth’ or ‘science’ and ’non-science’. It is part of the professionalisation of a scientific 
discipline to agree on a common methodological foundation. 
Given these considerations, the Kuhnian concept of incommensurability – just as moot as 
the ‘paradigm’ – may be brought to life: different paradigms are always (as a necessary 
and sufficient condition) incommensurable, as they are based on different ‘world views’ 
or ‘pre-analytical visions’.2 Any set of theories which share the same ontological basis may 
be incompatible in their epistemological and methodological dimensions – i.e. with 
respect to their specific assumptions in the protective belt (e.g. the assumption of 
imperfect markets is obviously incompatible with the assumption of perfect markets) or 
with regard to their methodical perspective (i.e. taking a static approach versus a dynamic 
approach) – yet they are certainly commensurable in forming a common paradigm based 
on a “[…] strong network of commitments — conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and 
methodological” (Kuhn, 1970: 42).3 On the other hand, different paradigms – as 
                                                          
2 The most eminent example of a scientific revolution and arguably the analytical foundation of Kuhn’s 
SSR (see Kuhn 1957) – the Copernican cosmological revolution – is based on such a shift in the ‘world 
view’ or ‘pre-analytic vision’ which makes the ‘old’ geo-centric Ptolemaic paradigm incommensurable 
with the ‘new’ helio-centric Copernican paradigm: cosmology is thus either geo- or helio-centric but 
evidently it cannot be both. 
3 New Classical Macroeconomics and the different variants of neo- and standard-Keynesianism 
combine to form the Walrasian ‘Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium’ model (DSGE), yet they are 
incompatible with respect to (protective belt) assumptions of market structures and information 
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incommensurable as they necessarily are – may (and actually will) share a common 
methodological understanding as a quality-control device and, therefore, may well be 
compatible in this respect. Finally, I do not see any reason why different paradigms – as 
incommensurable as they necessarily are – cannot be compared with each other as 
Thomas (2020) appears to suggest. In fact, if different paradigms coexist – a situation 
pluralists take to be the only healthy state of the economics profession – a comparison of 
paradigms is needed in order to make an informed choice between the use of any 
paradigm in the first place (see e.g. Heise 2020a).4 Moreover, if comparison does not 
translate into a simple contrasting juxtaposition, modes and objectives of comparison 
must be conceived. Arguably, verisimilitude (i.e. the likelihood that conjectural 
knowledge is objective truth) is the most obvious candidate as objective of comparison 
(and choice). However, if verisimilitude cannot seriously be taken as a rational criterion 
of comparison and choice due to the methodological restrictions known as the ‘Duhem–
Quine critique’5, other objectives might be more practical: for instance, the realisticness 
of assumptions or the complexity of models (Ockham’s razor) in relating deductive 
outcome to empirical reality (for a more detailed discussion, see Heise 2020a).    
3. Kuhn’s SSR, Keynes’s GT and Walrasian general equilibrium 
theorising 
With respect to the controversy between P&W and Thomas, these elaborations have the 
following bearing: I wholeheartedly follow P&W’s argument that Keynes’s General Theory 
incorporates the outlines of an alternative economic paradigm which is incommensurate 
to theorising on Walrasian general equilibrium. And, therefore, I endorse the view that 
most of Keynesianism as depicted in textbooks and accepted by mainstream journals is a 
misconception of Keynes’s ideas arising from Walrasian distortions – ‘lost in translation’! 
Moreover, I would personally subscribe to P&W’s view that Keynes’s new paradigm 
provides a better and more appropriate tool for understanding ‘the real world’ than 
                                                          
availability. In terms of P&W’s contribution, sharing the same paradigms means, with respect to the 
different Keynesiansims, that they adapt and absorb Keynes’s theoretical constructs into a WGE ‘world 
view’ or ‘pre-analytic vision’.    
4 Of course, the choice can also be based on forms of compulsion (e.g. career perspectives) or simply 
ignorance (about rival paradigms).  
5 According to the ‘Duhem–Quine critique’, only single theoretical statements can be objectively 
falsified, not entire paradigms. However, even falsifying single components of paradigms may cast light 
on the capabilities of paradigms and their status as ‘progressive’ or ‘degenerating’ (in Lakatosian 
parlance). As I have tried to show, the inability of standard neoclassical labour economics to explain 
the (negligible) impact of minimum wages on employment certainly casts some doubt not only on 
neoclassical labour market theory but also the entire paradigm (see Heise 2020b).   
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Walrasian general equilibrium economics – and, if this is to mean that Keynes’s paradigm 
is superior to WGE, I would also support that conclusion. 
But this is only my personal view based on my assessment of the core assumptions of 
what I believe to be Keynes’s paradigm as compared to the core assumptions of WGE. Yet 
this is where Rod Thomas’s critique comes in: if there is no objective inter-paradigmatic 
comparison on the basis of verisimilitude, the choice of a paradigm must be based on more 
subjective criteria, such as an assessment of assumptions or model structures. Although 
this cannot be helped – certainly not by rejecting Kuhn’s entire approach and replacing it 
by an alternative, which is to run into exactly the same problem of not being able to 
objectively discriminate between competing theories – it is simply to accept the pluralistic 
nature of the economic discipline and to advocate inter-paradigmatic comparison and 
methodological rigor as quality-control devices to shield the discipline against the 
accusation of pure relativism. 
This, of course, is a crucial point: what are the core assumptions – the world view or pre-
analytic vision – of Keynes’s new economics in contrast to the core assumptions of WGE? 
The latter can be named rather easily: the axioms of rationality, (gross) substitution, 
neutrality of money and ergodicity seem to be unchallenged in order to found a paradigm 
ontologically describing an inter-temporal exchange economy optimally allocating scarce 
resources as its world view or pre-analytic vision. However, with respect to the new 
paradigm exposed in the General Theory, such core assumptions encapsulating a different 
world view or pre-analytic vision are less obvious: Keynes not only failed to inform the 
readers of the General Theory about his alternative ontological base, but he also sowed 
some doubt about the incommensurability of his new economics with WGE (or, rather, 
the Marshallian version of that paradigm) when he called his magnum opus ‘general’ 
instead of ‘alternative’ and at various occasions declared (neo-)classical economics to be 
the specific (full employment, full capital utilisation) version of his more general 
approach6 – does that not imply the compatibility and, indeed, commensurability of 
Keynes’s ideas and WGE?7 This at least appears to have been the appraisal of most fellow 
economists starting the chicken-and-egg discussion about which approach is the more 
general and which is the more specific. And P&W happen not to inform their readers about 
                                                          
6 “We are thus led to a more general theory, which includes the classical theory with which we are 
familiar, as a special case” (Keynes 1936: XXIII). 
7 And is not Keynes’s neglect of market imperfections in the General Theory rooted in his desire 
and strategy to make his paradigm as compatible – and commensurable? – with the orthodoxy?  
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the evidence on which they built their judgement of incommensurability. Or, to put it 
more precisely: what is the incommensurable world view or pre-analytic vision in 
Keynes’s General Theory that sets it apart from the exchange paradigm of mainstream 
WGE?   
Earlier versions of Book I of the General Theory, unfortunately omitted in later revisions 
for the ‘principle of effective demand’, indicate that Keynes rejected the ontological basis 
of the exchange paradigm (which he labelled ’barter’, ‘real exchange’ or ‘cooperative 
economy’) for something he called the ‘monetary economy’ or ’entrepreneur economy’ 
(see Keynes 1979a; Keynes 1979b). Although Keynes remained rather silent about what 
exactly – in terms of its axiomatic structures – characterises this new paradigm and 
although he was not sufficiently aware of the importance of at least sketching his 
ontological basis,8 this void did not go unnoticed: it has been suggested that Keynes’s 
world view or pre-analytic vision is that of social reproduction under uncertainty based on 
nominal obligations (and private property as its underlying feature; see e.g. Heise 2019), 
assuming as core axioms non-substitution, monetary non-neutrality and non-ergodicity 
(see Davidson 1984; Davidson 2005). 
4. Conclusion 
This brief note was an attempt to reconcile P&W’s claim that Keynes’s new economics of 
the General Theory and WGE are incommensurable paradigms in a Kuhnian 
understanding and Thomas’s critique that  – if they were incommensurable – P&W’s 
appraisal of Keynes’s paradigm as a better approximation to the ‘real world’ than WGE is 
inconsistent within that very Kuhnian framework. Accepting paradigmatic pluralism as 
the only adequate state of the economic discipline, comparing economic paradigms which 
are necessarily incommensurable must become an acknowledged branch of scientific 
inquiry within the field of economics in order to prepare for the informed (but not 
necessarily an invariably determinate) choice between competing paradigms which every 
scientist has to make – and which P&W obviously made in favour of Keynes’s new 
economic paradigm, yet without sufficiently disclosing their selection procedure to 
convince Rod Thomas. 
 
                                                          
8 Which is something of a mystery, for he accused mainstream theory of precisely such “a lack in 
clearness and generality in the premises” (Keynes 1936: XXI). 
7 
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